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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—FOURTH AMENDMENT—STATE V. ALLEN: AN 
EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO UNCONSTITUTIONAL “SAFETY CHECKS” ON 
THE STATE’S WATERS  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a group of friends on Lake Hamilton in Hot Springs, Arkan-
sas; it has been a beautiful summer day on the water, but the sun is begin-
ning to set and everyone is heading back to the marina. The friends also 
decide it is time to call it a day and begin to make their way to the shore 
when, out of nowhere, another boat being operated by someone under the 
influence crashes into them at sixty miles per hour, critically injuring every-
one on board. 
With over 600,000 acres of lakes, 90,000 miles of rivers and streams,1 
and nearly 200,000 boats registered in Arkansas, this scenario, unfortunate-
ly, becomes a reality in the state every year.2 In the year 2013 alone, there 
were fifteen deaths across the state due to boating accidents, and the Arkan-
sas Game & Fish Commission listed alcohol as one of the primary causes.3 
After the Supreme Court of Arkansas’s holding in State v. Allen, which 
ruled provisions of Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-101-105 unconsti-
tutional,4 state law enforcement lost a valuable tool to help combat the prob-
lem.5 The invalidated statute provided: 
It shall be the duty of every sheriff, deputy sheriff, state police officer, 
and enforcement officer of the Arkansas State Game and Fish Commis-
sion to enforce the provisions of this chapter . . . . In the exercise of their 
duty to enforce the provisions of this chapter, they shall have the authori-
 
 1. Boating Information, ARK. GAME & FISH COMM’N (2011), http://www.agfc.com/
fishing/Pages/BoatingInformation.aspx. 
 2. 2014 BOATING ACCIDENT YEAR-END REPORT, ARK. GAME & FISH COMM’N, 2 (2014), 
http://www.agfc.com/fishing/Documents/BoatingAccidentReport.pdf. The boating industry 
in Arkansas had an annual economic impact of $1.97 billion in 2012. Economic Significance 
of Recreational Boating in Arkansas, NAT’L MARINE MFRS. ASS’N (2013), 
http://www.nmma.org/assets/cabinets/Cabinet508/Arkansas_Boating_Economics%
20State.pdf. 
 3. ARK. GAME & FISH COMM’N, supra note 2, at 3. 
 4. State v. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 5, 425 S.W.3d 753, 757. 
 5. With the statutory power taken away, law enforcement made just sixty “boating 
under the influence” arrests in 2013, compared to over ninety the year before. ARK. GAME & 
FISH COMM’N, supra note 2. 
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ty to stop and board any vessel subject to this chapter and to investigate 
any accident or violation involving vessels subject to this chapter.
6
 
The court in Allen held that the statute in question gave law enforce-
ment “unfettered discretion” in stopping vessels on the state’s waterways for 
“safety checks” and that it, consequently, “violate[d] the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.”7 The court instead imposed a strict prob-
able cause standard for all future stops.8 
While the decision to invalidate Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-
101-105 was correct, the probable cause standard propounded by the Allen 
court is simply not enough to combat accidents caused by persons boating 
while intoxicated; therefore, the court or legislature should lower the stand-
ard to one of reasonable suspicion. 
Part II of this note examines both the past and present laws in place 
with respect to boating in Arkansas.9 Part III discusses the court’s holding in 
Allen, along with its repercussions in the operations of law enforcement 
across the state.10 Lastly, Part III of this note then argues for a new standard 
for law enforcement to follow, similar to the one presently used in Michi-
gan.11 
II. BACKGROUND 
Currently, there are three bodies of law that regulate boating in the 
State of Arkansas: the (1) Arkansas Code,12 (2) Arkansas Game & Fish 
Regulations,13 and (3) United States Coast Guard Regulations.14 Under this 
trichotomy of law, multiple state and federal agencies are tasked with boat-
ing enforcement, ranging from local sheriff’s departments and state wildlife 
officers15 to the United States Coast Guard.16 
 
 6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-101-105(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (Repl. 2010). 
 7. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 5, 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
 8. See id., 425 S.W.3d at 757 (discussing the standards to be used for future water-
based stops). 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-101-101 to -904 (Repl. 2010). 
 13. ARK. CONST. amend. XXXV, § 1. 
 14. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (2013). 
 15. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-101-105(a)(1)(A). 
 16. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a). 
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A. Arkansas Statutes Governing Boating 
The Arkansas statutes governing boating in the state can be found in 
Title 27, Chapter 101 of the Arkansas Code.17 To ensure the chapter’s en-
forcement, the Arkansas General Assembly adopted Arkansas Code Anno-
tated section 27-101-105 in 1993,18 giving the state’s Game & Fish Com-
mission, along with local law enforcement agencies, the authority to pull 
over any boat to check compliance with state boating safety law.19 
These provisions can generally be divided into two types. The first 
primarily deals with the operation of vessels on the water20 and can be readi-
ly observed by law enforcement from a distance.21 A subpart of this category 
would include registration regulations;22 for example, the requirement of 
 
 17. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 27-101-101 to -904 (providing laws governing watercraft in 
the State of Arkansas). 
 18. Id. § 27-101-105. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. § 27-101-202. Subsection one of the statute forbids operation of vessels in a reck-
less or negligent manner that endangers life, limb, or property of any person and provides 
examples of this type of behavior including weaving through congested vessel traffic, operat-
ing within 100 feet of a towboat, and jumping the wake too close to another vessel. Id. § 27-
101-202(1). Subsection two of the statute prohibits operation of vessels at a speed that creates 
hazardous wakes for other vessels. Id. § 27-101-202(2). Subsection three makes it illegal to 
operate a vessel within one hundred feet (100′) of a designated recreation area, dock, pier, 
raft, float, anchored boat, dam, intake structure, or other obstruction at over five miles per 
hour unless another limit has been posted. Id. § 27-101-202(3). Subsection four forbids the 
operation of any vessel or skis where they may strike another object or person. Id. § 27-101-
202(4). Subsection five requires using either a spotter or mirror when towing. Id. § 27-101-
202(5). Subsection six forbids towing skiers either one half hour after sunrise or before sun-
set. Id. § 27-101-202(6). Subsection seven forbids operating a vessel under the influence. Id. 
§ 27-101-202(7). Subsection eight prohibits loading boats beyond their capacities. Id. § 27-
101-202(8). Subsection nine makes it illegal to allow people to ride on the decking over the 
bow unless the boat is over twenty-six feet. Id. § 27-101-202(9). Subsection ten makes it 
illegal for a person under twelve to operate a vessel with over a ten horsepower motor unless 
under direct supervision. Id. § 27-101-202(10). Subsection eleven prohibits operating a vessel 
in any grossly negligent way that results in a serious injury or death to any person. Id. § 27-
101-202(11). Subsection twelve makes it illegal to operate a vessel in a negligent manner, 
specifically inattentive operation, failing to keep a lookout, failing to abide by the inland 
navigation rules, and operating in a way that causes collision with another vessel or object. 
Id. § 27-101-202(12). 
 21. See id. § 27-101-202 (providing laws governing the operation of vessels on the 
state’s waterways). 
 22. Id. § 27-101-301. According to the statute: 
Every motorboat on the waters of this state shall be numbered. No person shall 
operate or give permission for the operation of any motorboat on the waters of 
this state unless: (1) The motorboat is numbered: (A) In accordance with this 
subchapter; or (B) In accordance with applicable federal law; or (C) In accord-
ance with a federally approved numbering system of another state; and (2)(A) 
The certificate of number awarded to the motorboat is in full force and effect; 
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three-inch block lettering for registration numbers on the front sides of the 
vessels.23 The second category, however, requires closer inspection of the 
vessel in order to determine compliance and consists mainly of requirements 
for certain safety equipment, such as floatation devices.24 Another example 
of this second type of law would be Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-
101-501, which requires boater safety and training education for all persons 
born after 1986.25 Law enforcement would have to conduct a search and 
seizure of the person operating the vessel in order to determine if any of 
these types of violations had occurred. 
B. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission Boating Regulations 
As the first body of law governing Arkansas’s waters comes from the 
state legislature, the second is derived from Amendment Thirty-Five to the 
Arkansas Constitution. Amendment Thirty-Five, in general, grants the Ar-
kansas Game & Fish Commission the broad authority to regulate the state’s 
wildlife.26 This regulatory authority gives the commission sanction to create 
and enforce wildlife regulations on the state’s waters.27 
The Code of Arkansas Rules gives wide latitude to the Arkansas Game 
& Fish Commission by authorizing wildlife officers to “go upon any proper-
 
and (B) The identifying number set forth in the certificate of number is displayed 
on each side of the bow of the motorboat. 
Id. 
 23. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-101-305(a)(2) (Repl. 2010). The statute requires: 
The numbers to be procured and attached shall be at least three inches (3″) in 
height and of block character, and shall be attached to the forward half of each 
side of the vessel and clearly visible, pursuant to federal law, and attached in 
such a manner and position on the boat as may be prescribed by the rules and 
regulations of the Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission in order that they 
may be clearly visible. 
Id. 
 24. Id. § 27-101-203 (Repl. 2010). 
 25. Id. § 27-101-501CB(d) (Repl. 2010). The statute provides: 
In order to operate a motorboat or a personal watercraft in Arkansas, all Arkan-
sas residents born on or after January 1, 1986, and of legal age to operate a mo-
torboat or personal watercraft must have successfully completed: (A) A commis-
sion-approved safe boating course and examination under subdivision (b)(2) of 
this section to obtain a permanent boater education certificate; or (B) A ques-
tionnaire to obtain a temporary boater education certificate under subsection 
(d)(4) of this section. 
Id. 
 26. ARK. CONST. amend. XXXV, § 1. The state constitutional amendment provides that: 
“the control, management, restoration, conservation and regulation of birds, fish, game and 
wildlife resources of the State . . . [and] the administration of the laws now and/or hereafter 
pertaining thereto, shall be vested in a Commission to be known as the Arkansas State Game 
and Fish Commission.” Id. 
 27. Id. 
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ty outside of private dwellings, posted or otherwise, in performance of their 
duties . . . and to conduct searches with or without a warrant according to 
the law.”28 The code goes even further by allowing wildlife officers to “stop 
and detain any person who they Reasonably suspect is, or recently has been, 
involved in any hunting, fishing, or trapping activity to conduct an adminis-
trative inspection to determine whether the person is in compliance with the 
laws and regulations of the State . . . .”29 The Arkansas General Assembly 
greatly exceeded previous delegations of authority to the Commission, how-
ever, when it passed Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-101-501, which 
charges the Game & Fish Commission with being the state agency primarily 
responsible for regulating all boating in the state,30 presumably whether the 
boating activity is related to wildlife or not. 
Along with the broad discretion it gives wildlife officers in the field, 
the Arkansas Code also dedicates an entire chapter to “General Fishing 
Regulations,” supplying officers with a plethora of grounds for seizing boats 
that they “reasonably suspect” have been engaged in fishing activity.31 Two 
of the most common regulations from this chapter that warrant stops of ves-
 
 28. 002-00-001 ARK. CODE R. § 01.00-B (LexisNexis 2015). The regulation states: 
Wildlife Officers shall be commissioned by the Commission and shall have the 
right to apprehend persons detected of violating any of the laws or regulations of 
the State enacted for the protection of game, fish, furbearing animals and other 
wildlife, and to take such offenders before any court having jurisdiction in the 
county where such offense is committed. Wildlife Officers shall be authorized to 
serve all processes issued by a court of competent jurisdiction relating to the en-
forcement of all laws and regulations pertaining to game, fish, furbearing animals 
and other wildlife of the State . . . . 
Id. 
 29. Id. The relevant part of the regulation states: 
Wildlife Officers lawfully present in any place may, in the performance of their 
duties, stop and detain any person who they Reasonably suspect is, or recently 
has been, involved in any hunting, fishing, or trapping activity to conduct an ad-
ministrative inspection to determine whether the person is in compliance with the 
laws and regulations of the State enacted for the protection of game, fish, fur-
bearing animals and other wildlife. 
Id. 
 30. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-101-501. The statute specifies that “(a) The General Assembly 
finds and determines that: (1) The regulation of boating and boaters in the state is the primary 
responsibility of the Arkansas State Game and Fish Commission under Arkansas Constitu-
tion, Amendment 35 . . . .” Id. 
 31. 002-00-001 ARK. CODE R. § 01.00-B. 
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sels include checking the boater for a valid fishing license32 and checking to 
make sure the boater is within the allowed limit of fish caught.33 
The code’s expansive delegation of power to wildlife officers does not 
end with the authority to only seize the boats, however. Upon stopping a 
vessel that the officers reasonably suspect has been fishing, the code makes 
it illegal for a boater to refuse to let them search and inspect a number of 
items including ice chests, bags, and virtually any container present on the 
vessel.34 With both the power to stop vessels for numerous reasons and 
broad authority to search them, the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission has 
the most power of any state agency on the water.35 
C. Federal Laws on Arkansas’s Waters 
Unlike the first two bodies of law created by the Arkansas General As-
sembly, which provide modest limits on the discretion allowed to state of-
ficers, the third governing authority, coming from Title 14, Section 7 of the 
United States Code, authorizes the United States Coast Guard to board any 
vessel on United States waters, at any time, for any reason.36 This statute 
gives virtually unlimited authority to the United States Coast Guard on all of 
the nation’s waters.37 
Currently, the Coast Guard has 20 active military and 142 auxiliary 
members in the State of Arkansas, operating with a force of two boats and 
 
 32. Id. § 03.02. The regulation makes it illegal to fish “in any manner in Arkansas with-
out possessing on the person the appropriate Arkansas fishing license as provided herein” and 
goes on to list permitted licenses for different classes of fishermen, including residents, non-
residents, commercial and sport fishermen, and youth and elderly licenses. Id. 
 33. Id. § 25.01. This regulation makes it “unlawful to keep more than the daily or aggre-
gate limit of game fish while fishing or transporting fish by boat during a one-day fishing 
trip,” with limits set by the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission. Id. 
 34. Id. § 05.28. The rule provides that it is “unlawful to refuse to immediately surrender 
the following items to a wildlife officer upon request for lawful inspection: any killing de-
vice, license, permit, tag, stamp, check sheet, ice chest, game bag, game vest, wildlife, fishing 
tackle, equipment used for hunting or fishing or container that can reasonably hold wildlife.” 
Id. 
 35. See generally id. § 01.00-B (authorizing Game & Fish officers to stop and search 
any person they reasonably suspect is or has been engaging in wildlife activities). 
 36. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (2013). The statute establishes that “[t]he Coast Guard may make 
inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and 
waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and sup-
pression of violations of laws of the United States.” Id. The provision goes on to authorize 
Coast Guard personnel to “at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction . . 
. of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship’s documents and 
papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel 
compliance.” Id. 
 37. See id. (authorizing Coast Guard personnel to board at any time any vessel that is 
subject to United States jurisdiction). 
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one cutter.38 Even though the United States Coast Guard has the most discre-
tion in enforcing law on state waters, its personnel limitations necessitate 
that state agencies are primarily tasked with this duty.39 
D. The Court’s Holding in Allen 
The Allen case presented the Supreme Court of Arkansas with its first 
opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of Arkansas Code Annotated 
section 27-101-105. The court began its analysis by noting three critical 
facts from the arresting officer’s testimony concerning the stop of Allen’s 
boat. The officer testified that “[t]here was no determination on what boats 
[he] might pull over,” that he was not “pulling over every boat for a safety 
check,” and that there was no plan in place when he stopped Allen’s boat.40 
From this testimony, the court began to apply traditional Fourth Amendment 
standards that are used in analyzing traffic stops.41 
The fundamental Fourth Amendment principle on which the court fo-
cused was that “[r]egardless of how brief or slight the intrusion, or how 
weighty the public interest, ‘an individual’s reasonable expectation of priva-
cy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of 
officers in the field.’”42 Along with this precedent, the court also focused on 
the officer’s testimony that “he did not believe he had ‘the unfettered discre-
tion to pull over any boat at any time for any reason that [he desired],’ but 
only to perform a safety check” in accordance with Arkansas Code Annotat-
ed section 27-101-105.43 
Taking both of these facts into consideration, the supreme court deter-
mined that the stop was based solely “on the law-enforcement officer’s sub-
jective assertion of his or her purpose when the Fourth Amendment requires 
objective facts supporting the stop or a plan embodying explicit, neutral 
limitations” and that “the practice of safety-check stops by law-enforcement 
officers in this case violates the Fourth Amendment.”44 Accordingly, the 
court ruled Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-101-105 was unconstitu-
 
 38. U.S. COAST GUARD, U.S. COAST GUARD IN ARKANSAS 2014, 
http://www.uscg.mil/publicaffairs/statedatasheets/ARKANSAS.pdf. The local United States 
Coast Guard presence includes a budget of $1,041,904 for operating expenses in the state and 
$1,421,896 in boating safety grants. Id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. State v. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 3, 425 S.W.3d 753, 756. 
 41. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 756. 
 42. Id. at 5, 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
 43. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
 44. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
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tional and adopted the current probable cause standard for traffic stops to be 
used on the state’s waters.45 
III. ARGUMENT 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas’s decision in State v. Allen, while cor-
rect in ruling the random stops unconstitutional, was wrong in its adoption 
of the probable cause standard. By adopting the stricter standard of probable 
cause,46 the court effectively and unnecessarily took away an invaluable tool 
from law enforcement officers who seek to protect Arkansas’s boaters. Ad-
ditionally, it led to the hasty adoption of an unworkable, “roadblock” style 
safety stop for vessels47 and inadvertently created double standards for dif-
ferent classes of boaters.48 
Instead of denying law enforcement the use of “safety checks” by ap-
proaching the issue with the same analysis used in the constitutionality of 
traffic stops, the court should follow more reasonable approaches taken in 
other states. Additionally, as explained in more detail below, the state legis-
lature might be well advised to adopt an approach similar to Michigan’s. To 
emphasize the implications of the new probable cause standard, Section A 
of this Part brings to light the problems with the court’s analysis in Allen. 
Section B, then, discusses the implications of adopting the court’s new 
standard. Section C shows how the court’s new standard led the Arkansas 
Game & Fish Commission to adopt unworkable policies and procedures for 
water-based stops. Section D discusses how the new standard inadvertently 
created a double standard for different classes of boaters. Section E, then, 
illustrates the impracticality of the new standard in a real world situation. 
Section F introduces the current law in Michigan, as an example of a more 
practical standard. Section G argues for a new standard, similar to the one 
currently used in Michigan. 
 
 45. See id., 425 S.W.3d at 757 (setting forth the new standards to be used when conduct-
ing water-based stops). 
 46. See Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 5, 425 S.W.3d at 757 (discussing the new standards to be 
adhered to by law enforcement when making water-based stops in the future). 
 47. See ARK. GAME & FISH COMM’N, LEP-30 EST. 07/92, INTERNAL POLICY & 
PROCEDURE: LAW ENFORCEMENT CHECKPOINTS (Nov. 2013) (providing procedures that must 
be followed by Arkansas Game & Fish officers before conducting a checkpoint on the water). 
 48. See generally Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 5, 425 S.W.3d at 757 (holding “safety checks” 
conducted pursuant to ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-101-105 to be unconstitutional but not ruling on 
the constitutionality of “compliance checks” conducted by the Game & Fish Commission 
under the authority of 002-00-001 ARK. CODE R. § 01.00-B); 002-00-001 ARK. CODE R. § 
01.00-B (LexisNexis 2015) (authorizing Arkansas Game & Fish officers to stop and search 
any persons reasonably suspected of engaging in wildlife activities). 
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A. Problems with the Court’s Analysis in State v. Allen 
The major problems with the Allen court’s analysis can be attributed to 
the lack of state common law dealing with safety stops on the water.49 Un-
fortunately, the only state precedent that the court had available to look to 
when deciding the case came from the state appellate court’s 2010 holding 
in Brewer v. State,50 in which the majority ignored all other states’ case laws 
for guidance despite there being no precedent in Arkansas.51 
By not looking to other states for direction, the appellate court’s opin-
ion in Brewer began with a major flaw: it analyzed the stop of vessels on the 
open water in the same way that it analyzed traditional search and seizures,52 
despite their inherent differences.
 53 
As it turned out, even though the constitutionality of the safety check 
was discussed, the Brewer court never had the opportunity to rule on the 
validity of Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-101-105 because law en-
forcement had probable cause to conduct the stop and the defense counsel 
did not preserve the constitutional question on appeal.54 Nevertheless, the 
appellate court’s discussion laid the groundwork for the supreme court’s 
analysis in Allen, just three years later.55  
In light of the Brewer opinion, the Allen court began its discussion of 
the law by first setting forth the proper standards for determining the consti-
 
 49. Brewer v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 275, at *4, 2010 WL 1233832, at **2. The appel-
late court conceded at the beginning of its discussion that “[t]here is currently no case law in 
Arkansas concerning the circumstances under which a boat operating on a waterway in this 
state may properly be stopped and a search conducted.” Id., 2010 WL 1233832, at **2. 
 50. Id., 2010 WL 1233832, at **2.  
 51. See id., 2010 WL 1233832, at **2 (citing no case law from other states concerning 
water-based “safety check” stops); Allen, 2013 Ark. at 11, 425 S.W.3d at 760 (Danielson, J., 
dissenting) (citing cases in numerous states upholding the constitutionality of similar statutes 
to ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-101-105 that provide for random stops on waterways). 
 52. See generally Brewer, 2010 Ark. App. 275, 2010 WL 1233832. The court in Brewer 
concedes that there is no case law in Arkansas as of 2010 as to the circumstances under 
which a boat operating on a state waterway may be properly stopped and searched, so it then 
turns to the “well established” circumstances for motor vehicles for guidance. Id. at *4, 2010 
WL 1233832, at **2. The court then proceeds in its analysis of traffic based stops by stating 
“[i]n order to be valid, a traffic stop requires that the officer have probable cause to believe 
that a traffic violation has occurred.” Id., 2010 WL 1233832, at **2. 
 53. See U.S. v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 589 (1983) (discussing complica-
tions that arise when attempting to apply traditional traffic stop standards to situations with 
vessels on the open water). 
 54. Brewer, 2010 Ark. App. 275, at *6, 2010 WL 1233832, at **3. 
 55. See id. at *4, 2010 WL 1233832, at **2 (discussing the standards for determining 
the constitutionality of traffic stops); Allen, 2013 Ark. at 5, 425 S.W.3d at 757 (analyzing the 
stop of Allen’s boat using a traditional Fourth Amendment traffic stop approach). 
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tutionality of Fourth Amendment searches and seizures in general.56 After 
discussing the common law standards, the court proceeded to synthesize an 
overall standard, stating that “the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure 
must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society’s legitimate 
interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure 
must be carried out pursuant to a plan, embodying explicit, neutral limita-
tions on the conduct of the officers.”57 
Based on the facts of the case, the court determined that “Allen’s vessel 
was being operated in a legally unremarkable fashion” and that “there were 
no specific, objective facts about Allen’s vessel to indicate that society’s 
legitimate interests required the seizure of Allen and his particular vessel.”58 
After finding that there was no probable cause for the stop, the court ques-
tioned whether the law enforcement officers had a plan in place to determine 
what boats were to be stopped, which was also answered in the negative.59 
In light of these findings, the court held the stop of Allen’s boat, specifical-
ly, to be unconstitutional.60 
However, the court did not limit its ruling to the specific facts in Allen. 
Rather, it further declared the law enforcement practice, in its entirety, used 
to conduct safety checks as unconstitutional and in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.61 
 
 56. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 3, 425 S.W.3d at 756. The court noted, “The Fourth Amend-
ment, of course, ‘applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a 
brief detention short of traditional arrest.’” Id., 425 S.W.3d at 756 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 
443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979)). The court went on to state that “[w]henever law enforcement stops 
and restrains a person, the officer has ‘seized’ that person, and the Fourth Amendment re-
quires that the seizure be reasonable.” Id., 425 S.W.3d at 756 (citing Brown, 443 U.S. at 50). 
The court proceeds to explain that “[c]onsideration of the constitutionality of such seizures 
involves a weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to 
which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with indi-
vidual liberty.” Id. at 4, 425 S.W.3d at 756 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 50–51). The court 
continued, “A central concern in balancing these competing considerations in a variety of 
settings has been to assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not sub-
ject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.” Id., 425 
S.W.3d at 757 (quoting Brown, 443 U.S. at 50–51). 
 57. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
 58. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
 59. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 757. The law enforcement officer in the case testified that “while 
he tried to stop and perform a safety check on as many vessels as he could in a given day, 
there was no plan and nothing to determine which boats he stopped.” Id., 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
He went on to testify that while he did not believe that he had “the unfettered discretion to 
pull over any boat at any time for any reason that [he desired],” he did believe that he could 
pull over any boat to perform a safety check. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
 60. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
 61. Id. at 5, 425 S.W.3d at 757 (because officers did not have a reason to conduct a 
safety check on a vessel, it “mean[t] that whether the stop is proper depends only on the law-
enforcement officer’s subjective assertion of his or her purpose when the Fourth Amendment 
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The court’s determination that the statute was unconstitutional hinged 
on the fact that the statute purportedly gave officers “unfettered discretion to 
pull over any boat at any time for any reason.”62 This presents a second ma-
jor problem with the court’s approach to the case: it completely fails to dis-
cuss how the safety check situation fared in the balancing test presented in 
Delaware v. Prouse, a Supreme Court case in which the Court weighed the 
governmental interest in conducting the stop with the intrusion on the indi-
vidual’s Fourth Amendment rights.63 Instead of weighing the competing 
interests, the Allen court skipped ahead in the analysis and focused primarily 
on the fact that (1) there were no objective reasons for the officers to pull 
over Allen’s boat and (2) there was no plan in place.64 
The third major flaw in the court’s analysis arises from its failure to 
take into consideration case law in other states. Instead of approaching the 
constitutional validity of the safety check statute in Arkansas from a traffic 
stop line of analysis, the court should have focused on decisions from other 
jurisdictions that deal with the constitutionality of water-based stop statutes 
similar to Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-101-205. In his dissenting 
opinion, Justice Danielson mentioned numerous cases involving fact pat-
terns and statutes similar to those at issue in the Allen case.65 In all of those 
cases, the courts found the statutes allowing random, suspicionless stops of 
the vessels in question to be constitutional.66 Unfortunately, the majority in 
Allen, rather pointedly, ignored this precedent.67 
 
requires objective facts supporting the stop or a plan embodying explicit, neutral limita-
tions”). 
 62. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 3, 425 S.W.3d at 756. 
 63. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“[T]he permissibility of a particular 
law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”). 
 64. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 5, 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
 65. Id. at 10, 425 S.W.3d at 760 (Danielson, J., dissenting) (“While it is an issue of first 
impression in this state, other states with similar statutes have addressed this issue and upheld 
the statutes, failing to find any Fourth-Amendment violations.”). Justice Danielson cites cases 
from Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Texas. Id., 425 
S.W.3d at 760. 
 66. See State v. Casal, 410 So.2d 152, 155 (Fla. 1982); Peruzzi v. State, 567 S.E.2d 15, 
17 (Ga. 2002); People v. Roe, 270 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ill. 1971); State v. Giles, 669 A.2d 192, 
193–94 (Me. 1996); State v. Colosimo, 669 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Minn. 2003); State v. Pike, 532 
S.E.2d 543, 549 (N.C. App. 2000); Schenekl v. State, 30 S.W.3d 412, 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 
2000). 
 67. See Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 1–5, 425 S.W.3d at 753–57 (the majority references no 
cases dealing with water-based stops in its decision). 
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B. The Allen Holding Took Away an Invaluable Law Enforcement Tool 
By declaring that random safety checks on the water violate the Fourth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court of Arkansas severely undermined law en-
forcement’s ability to effectively combat the state’s intoxicated boater prob-
lem. 
The new standard that the court seemed to adopt in place of “safety 
checks” was one of probable cause.68 The major problem with this, however, 
is that there is an Arkansas statute currently in force that specifically pre-
vents law enforcement from using open container sightings in boats as prob-
able cause for pulling them over.69 Unfortunately, this means that even if 
law enforcement sees a group of people openly drinking on an open vessel, 
they have no grounds to stop it unless there is another observable violation 
of the law. 
C. The Arkansas Game & Fish Commission’s Response to the Holding in 
Allen 
Immediately following the supreme court’s holding in Allen, the Ar-
kansas Game & Fish Commission adopted an unworkable “roadblock” style 
policy for conducting safety checks on the water.70 This new policy is essen-
tially the same for water and land-based checkpoints in virtually every as-
pect, including the procedures for site selections and initial and secondary 
stops.71 The “Checkpoint Request Plan” form for the two different check-
 
 68. Id. at 4, 425 S.W.3d at 757 (discussing the standards to be used in conducting water-
based stops in the future). 
 69. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-103(b) (West, Westlaw current through the 2015 Reg. Sess. 
and 2015 1st Ex. Sess. of the 90th Arkansas General Assembly). The statute states, in particu-
lar, that “[t]he consumption of alcohol or the possession of an open container aboard a vessel 
does not in and of itself constitute probable cause that the person committed the offense of 
boating while intoxicated.” Id. 
 70. See ARK. GAME & FISH COMM’N, supra note 47, § 2.1.1.7, § 2.1.3 (setting forth the 
policy for both land and water-based checkpoint stops). 
 71. See id. With regards to site selection, the land-based policy reads: “Base the selec-
tion of sites on standard enforcement factors consider time of day, day of week, roadway, 
history of violations and/or complaints in the area, and any special activities in the area. . . . 
The site should have adequate space to divert vehicles if further action is needed.” Id. § 
2.1.1.7.  
The policy for water based site selection is virtually identical to the land-based policy: 
Base the selection of sites on standard enforcement factors considering time of 
day, day of week, waterway, history of violations and or complaints in the area, 
and any special activities in the area. Area selected should have an area which al-
lows for safe stops and should have an area to divert vessels or other water based 
conveyances if further action is needed. 
Id. § 2.1.3.  
The initial stop policy is similarly identical: 
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points is even the same, with only a checkbox at the top to designate wheth-
er it is for a water-based or a land-based checkpoint.72 Trying to conduct 
blocks on the water using the same standards as on the road presents a major 
problem because they are inherently different.73 Problems not only arise 
from the obvious differences between boats and automobiles, but also due to 
the areas in which they operate.74 
Another problem with adopting the “roadblock” style policy on the wa-
ter has to do with the potential effectiveness of the blocks on water. This can 
be attributed to the inherent difference between operation of boats and au-
tomobiles.75 There is statutory law in place that allows avoidance of law 
enforcement to be a factor in determining reasonable suspicion to stop a 
motor vehicle,76 but as Justice Rehnquist noted in the Supreme Court case of 
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, “vessels can move in any direction at 
any time and need not follow established ‘avenues’ as automobiles must 
 
Upon initial contact, law enforcement personnel should inform the occupants of 
the vehicle/vessel or other water based conveyance of the reason for the check-
point. The initial inquiries or demands that are made of the driver and or occu-
pants of the vehicle/vessel at a checkpoint should be within the scope of the pur-
poses for which the checkpoint is authorized, and must be within the statutory or 
regulatory authorities enforceable by the Arkansas Game and Fish Commission 
or by cooperating law enforcement personnel. After an initial stop and comple-
tion of the objectives of the checkpoint, a vehicle/vessel or other water based 
conveyance should not be involuntarily detained, unless law enforcement per-
sonnel have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct further action. 
Id. § 2.1.10. 
Similarly, the policy does not differentiate at all for secondary stop policy: 
Other activities, facts or circumstances observed as the vehicle/vessel or other 
water based conveyance approaches or is stopped at the checkpoint site may pre-
sent reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify diverting vehicles/vessels 
or other water based conveyance to a secondary site. Further action at the sec-
ondary site may be taken to the extent justified by the reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause for the secondary stop. 
Id. § 2.1.11. 
 72. See id. § 2.1.1 to 2.1.3 (explaining that the “Checkpoint Request Plan” is part of the 
internal policies and procedures of the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission and must be 
submitted and approved prior to conducting a checkpoint stop). 
 73. U.S. v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 589 (1983) (“[N]o reasonable claim can 
be made that permanent checkpoints would be practical on waters such as these where vessels 
can move in any direction at any time and need not follow established ‘avenues’ as automo-
biles must do.”). 
 74. Peruzzi v. State, 567 S.E.2d 15, 16–17 (Ga. 2002). The court in Peruzzi discusses 
this point in its holding when it notes “unlike cars traveling upon a public road, boats on an 
open body of water such as Lake Peachtree originate from a large number of docks and 
launches and need not follow any particular path. A roadblock is clearly infeasible . . . .” Id. 
at 16. 
 75. See ARK. GAME & FISH COMM’N, supra note 47. 
 76. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-81-203(14) (Repl. 2010). 
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do.”77 With no defined paths to follow, it would pose a near impossible chal-
lenge for law enforcement to try to determine whether the boater was merely 
joyfully boating or actively avoiding authorities. 
D. The Court’s New Standard Created Double Standards for Boaters 
By adopting a probable cause standard for law enforcement to use 
when stopping recreational boaters, the Supreme Court of Arkansas inad-
vertently created double standards for boaters on the state’s waters.78 
After the Allen decision, the least protected class of boaters are the 
sportsmen—those engaging in either fishing or hunting activities on the wa-
ter.79 With just a mere reasonable suspicion that a boater has been engaged 
in one of these wildlife activities, he can be stopped and boarded by Arkan-
sas Game & Fish officers to make sure that he is complying with state game 
and fish laws pursuant to the Code of Arkansas Rules.80 The officers not 
only have the authority to stop and board, but according to 002-00-001 Code 
of Arkansas Rules section 05.28, it is unlawful for a boater to refuse to let 
the officer inspect any container that can “reasonably hold wildlife,” includ-
ing all bags and ice chests on board.81   
The second class is made up of boaters that are purely recreational and 
not participating in sporting activities. They are the ones that are actually 
afforded the protection of the probable cause standard adopted by the court 
 
 77. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 589. 
 78. See State v. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 5, 425 S.W.3d 753, 757. 
 79. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
 80. 002-00-001 ARK. CODE R. § 01.00-B (LexisNexis 2015). The state’s appellate court 
reviewed the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission’s power to randomly stop any persons that 
officers reasonably suspect to be engaging in hunting or fishing activities. See Pickle v. State, 
2014 Ark. App. 726, at 11, 453 S.W.3d 157, 165. The court’s decision on the matter was 
split. Id., 453 S.W.3d at 165. Judge Vaught wrote the court’s opinion, with three judges 
agreeing and two concurring, which held that game and fish officers did not have the power 
to conduct these types of stops without a reasonable suspicion that the person was engaging 
or had been engaged in unlawful conduct, or without a sufficient plan of explicit, neutral 
limitations in place. Id. at 12, 453 S.W.3d at 165. In his concurring opinion, Judge Brown 
wrote that while he agreed with the outcome of the court’s opinion, he believed that game 
and fish officers did, in fact, have the power to conduct hunting and safety compliance checks 
without reasonable suspicion or a plan with explicit, neutral limitations. Id., 453 S.W.3d at 
157 (Brown, J., concurring). Chief Judge Gladwin wrote the dissenting opinion in the case, 
focusing on the inherent differences between the search of people engaged in the practice of 
hunting and fishing and those that are not. Id. at 1–11, 453 S.W.3d at 157–65 (Gladwin, C.J., 
dissenting). The dissent argues that “[t]he highly dangerous and regulated nature of hunting 
and fishing demands compliance checks, including questioning and checking of hunting and 
fishing equipment and licenses, even though similar actions might not be reasonable outside 
the hunting and fishing context.” Id. at 8, 453 S.W.3d at 169. 
 81. 002-00-001 ARK. CODE R. § 01.00-B. 
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in Allen.82 This dual standard poses yet another major problem for Game & 
Fish Commission officers in the field: they must determine whether a boater 
is either a sportsman or recreational boater prior to making the initial stop.83 
E. An Illustration of the Impracticality of the Law After Allen 
To illustrate the deficiency in the post-Allen law, consider applying it 
to the fictitious fact pattern introduced at the beginning of this note. Imagine 
the boat that caused the accident in the scenario motoring around the lake at 
a normal speed, not breaking any observable laws, but when it passes law 
enforcement patrol, the officers notice a number of open containers on the 
boat. 
At this point in the illustration, the law greatly depends on the identity 
of the particular law enforcement agency that is involved. If the unit were a 
local police or sheriff’s patrol, its stop would be held to the standard set 
forth in Allen. As mentioned earlier, the officers could not use solely the 
sight of open containers in the vessel as grounds for probable cause because 
of Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-65-103.84 This means that if the of-
ficers did not observe any clear operating violations, they would not have 
grounds for a constitutional stop, and thus allowing the boater to continue on 
without questioning and ending just like the fact pattern above. If the unit 
happened to be an Arkansas Game & Fish patrol, the first thing that the 
wildlife officers would need to do would be to make a determination of what 
class of boater the vessel falls into. If the officers reasonably suspect that the 
boat had been engaged in a wildlife activity, a stop would be warranted and 
an inspection and arrest would have most likely occurred, preventing the 
impending collision. On the other hand, if the officers had found the boat to 
be purely recreational, the probable cause standard would be used, as it was 
in the scenario with the local police and sheriff’s department patrols, and the 
boat would not have been stopped, inevitably resulting in the accident. 
If the drunken boater had the unlikely misfortune of passing a United 
States Coast Guard unit, there would have almost certainly been a stop, giv-
en that they have the authority to stop and board any vessel for any reason.85 
Now, suppose instead that law enforcement was not patrolling when 
the boat passed, but had a “roadblock” style checkpoint on the water. As 
noted in cases above, this would most likely not result in a stop either. There 
would be any number of options available for the vessel to avoid it.86 The 
 
 82. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 5, 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
 83. Id., 425 S.W.3d at 757. 
 84. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-65-103(b) (Supp. 2013). 
 85. 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (2013). 
 86. See U.S. v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 589 (1983) (discussing the impracti-
cability of water-based checkpoints on lakes and rivers). 
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driver may either just go around the checkpoint,87 go in the opposite direc-
tion, or simply wait the checkpoint out.88 
Based on the application above, the differing levels of discretion that 
the law grants to the various law enforcement agencies combined with the 
double standard for boaters greatly impacts the officers’ efficiency in keep-
ing our state’s waterways safe for the public. 
F. The Court and Legislature Should Look to Michigan for Guidance 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas and the Arkansas General Assembly 
should look to other states’ approaches to water-based stops and form the 
state’s own, more workable, standard for law enforcement agencies to fol-
low on the water, such as the one passed by the legislature in Michigan.89 
The Michigan standard is unique in that it only provides the extra con-
stitutional protection provided by the “reasonable suspicion” standard for 
stops of boats to those that have previously cleared a safety inspection by 
law enforcement.90 On the other hand, for those vessels that have not re-
ceived a decal denoting that they have passed a safety inspection from law 
enforcement,91 officers in the field need no reason to stop them to check for 
compliance.92 
 
 87. Lake Hamilton, where the fact pattern is set, has an area of approximately 7,460 
acres. Lake Hamilton, Arkansas Lakes and Rivers, ARK. DEP’T. OF PARKS & TOURISM (2014), 
http://www.arkansas.com/places-to-go/lakes-rivers/lake.aspx?id=18. 
 88. According to the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission policy, there must be a set 
time limit approved before conducting a checkpoint. ARK. GAME & FISH COMM’N, supra note 
47. The Arkansas Game & Fish Commission’s current “checkpoint” policy states that 
“[b]efore a checkpoint may be conducted, a checkpoint plan should be submitted on the 
standard checkpoint request plan form and approved by a supervisory law enforcement of-
ficer or designated officer in charge. The checkpoint plan should address . . . [t]he approxi-
mate time and duration of the checkpoint.” Id. 
 89. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.80166 (Supp. 2014). 
 90. Id. § 324.80166(2) (stating that “[a] peace officer shall not stop and inspect a vessel 
bearing the decal described in section 80166a . . . unless that peace officer has a reasonable 
suspicion that the vessel or the vessel’s operator is in violation of a marine law or is other-
wise engaged in criminal activity”). 
 91. See id. § 324.80166a. This section provides that: 
(1) The department may enter into an agreement with the United States coast 
guard, the United States coast guard auxiliary, or an organization sponsored by 
the United States coast guard or the United States coast guard auxiliary to pro-
vide for vessel safety checks of a vessel and its equipment. An agreement entered 
into under this subsection shall not preclude the department, or any peace officer 
within his or her jurisdiction, from performing an inspection of a vessel or the 
vessel’s equipment for enforcement purposes or courtesy purposes.  
 
(2) An agreement entered into under this section shall specify that the United 
States coast guard, the United States coast guard auxiliary, or an organization 
sponsored by the United States coast guard or the United States coast guard aux-
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By creating this incentive of protection from baseless search and sei-
zures, the Michigan legislature has not only created a major incentive for 
safety law compliance that serves the state’s interest in ensuring its citizens’ 
safety on the water, but has also provided a clear standard for law enforce-
ment officers to follow in the field.93 
Ohio has recently taken Michigan’s lead with respect to boater law, 
with its legislature passing the “Ohio Boater Freedom Act” in 2013.94 The 
Ohio Act set forth a reasonable suspicion standard for law enforcement to 
use in the field,95 reasoning that the state’s practice of conducting random, 
suspicionless “safety checks” was an “intrusive and time-consuming bur-
den” on its citizens.96 
 
iliary shall provide the department with a sufficient number of vessel safety 
check decals for conservation officers and those counties that participate in the 
marine safety program. In addition to any other information that is included on a 
vessel safety check decal, each vessel safety check decal shall bear the likeness 
of the state seal of Michigan. The vessel safety check decal shall display the year 
in which the decal was issued and during which it is valid.  
 
(3) Upon the completion of an inspection of a vessel or the vessel’s equipment 
by a peace officer, the United States coast guard, the United States coast guard 
auxiliary, or an organization sponsored by the United States coast guard or the 
United States coast guard auxiliary, the peace officer or person performing the 
inspection shall affix to the vessel the vessel safety check decal provided for in 
this section. 
Id. 
 92. See id. § 324.80166(1). The statute states that: 
[u]pon the direction of a peace officer acting in the lawful performance of his or 
her duty, the operator of a vessel moving on the waters of this state shall imme-
diately bring the vessel to a stop or maneuver it in a manner that permits the 
peace officer to come beside the vessel. The operator of the vessel shall do the 
following upon the request of the peace officer: (a) Provide his or her correct 
name and address. (b) Exhibit the certificate of number awarded for the vessel. 
(c) If the vessel does not bear a decal described in section 80166a or an equiva-
lent decal issued by or on behalf of another state, submit to a reasonable inspec-
tion of the vessel and to a reasonable inspection and test of the equipment of the 
vessel. 
Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Majority Caucus, Ohio House Passes “Boater Freedom Act,” MAJORITY CAUCUS 
BLOG (June 4, 2013), http://www.ohiohouse.gov/republicans/press/ohio-house-passes-boater-
freedom-act. 
 95. Id. The Republican caucus wrote that “House Bill 29 specifies that the state’s law 
enforcement personnel may only stop a vessel if they have reasonable suspicion that the 
vessel or vessel’s operator are in violation of marine law or otherwise engaged in criminal 
activity.” Id. 
 96. Id. 
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G. Arkansas Should Adopt a Standard Similar to Michigan’s 
In light of the innovative Michigan and Ohio standards, Arkansas 
should adopt a similar law; however, the law adopted by Arkansas should 
include a requirement for boaters to allow law enforcement to conduct safe-
ty checks as part of the registration process of the vessel. By making the 
checks and the display decal indicating the boat’s passage of the inspections 
mandatory, Arkansas law enforcement would not only be able to quickly 
and clearly distinguish between the checked and unchecked boats on the 
water, but would automatically be given cause to pull over boats that do not 
have the decal displayed. This would allow state officers to further the 
state’s interest in keeping the waterways safe by being able to focus on boats 
that have not been held up to safety standards. 
In practice, adopting this type of law in Arkansas would prove to be an 
effective way to balance the government’s interest in boating safety with the 
intrusiveness of a stop, as suggested by the majority opinion in Allen.97 A 
Michigan style standard would allow Arkansas law enforcement to clearly 
distinguish between boats that have passed inspections and those that have 
not in the field.98 
For example, consider applying this proposed standard to the fact pat-
tern set forth in the introduction. The infeasible “roadblock” style check-
point would no longer be an issue, so law enforcement in the situation 
would most likely be patrolling the lake freely. If they passed the subject 
boat, and it had no safety inspection compliance sticker, the officers would 
automatically be authorized to stop and inspect the vessel. On the other 
hand, if the boat did have the decal that indicated it had passed safety in-
spection, the officers would still only be held to a “reasonable suspicion” 
standard. This means that the officers would have a chance to look at the 
totality of the circumstances, including the occupants of the vessel openly 
drinking alcoholic beverages, to determine whether a stop is permitted or 
not. In either one of these cases, it is likely that law enforcement would be 
able to prevent the impending accident by stopping the vessel in question, be 
it through the obvious violation of safety inspection laws or through objec-
tive facts amounting to reasonable suspicion. 
 
 97. State v. Allen, 2013 Ark. 35, at 4, 425 S.W.3d 753, 756. The court noted that 
“[c]onsideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a weighing of the gravity of 
the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public 
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” Id., 425 S.W.3d at 756. 
 98. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.80166 (requiring a decal to be placed on the side 
of the boat indicating that it had passed a “safety check”). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Arkansas has been blessed with an abundance of lakes and rivers for its 
citizens to enjoy,99 but with that blessing comes the responsibility to keep its 
citizens safe in their activities. The state’s law enforcement agencies, how-
ever, lost a valuable tool for doing so when the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
held Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-101-105 to be unconstitutional. 
Even though the court made the right decision on that point, the alternative 
probable cause standard that it adopted does not give law enforcement offi-
cials the discretion required to successfully protect the public. The court and 
legislature should look to the current law in Michigan and adopt a similar 
standard, making safety checks required at registration and reasonable sus-
picion the new standard for stops of all vessels, which would prove to be 
much more effective in combating the state’s intoxicated boater problem. 
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